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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK ALDON HEWITT,
Plaintiff and Appellamt,
-vs.THE GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
8038

Appellant's Brief
in Ansvver to Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing
POINT I.
THERE WAS EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE
JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
For convenience, the Appellant answers the first
two points of Respondent's brief under this one heading.
Although the Petition for Rehearing and brief in support thereof, if confined to the record, do not raise any
new matters
which were not covered by the briefs preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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viou~ly

submitted in this matter, we nevertheless feel
t·oustrained to submit this answer brief.
The first point raised by the brief in support of the
p(•tition for rehearing is that the inference that the
<lefl'ndant was negligent was not warranted by the evid('lH'('. ~rhe evidence under this point was quite fully
~un1marized in appellant's brief on appeal to which we
re~pectfully refer the court. The defendant urges that
the jury could reasonably find from the evidence in
this case that the plaintiff was negligent and the evidence
upon "·hich defendant's rely in this connection is the
experiment which it performed on a similar tire, which
established that it required 155 pounds of air pressure
to break the wires in the bead and explode the tire. In
a second experiment on the same tire after the bead
wires had been broken the tire did not explode until 53
pounds of air had been introduced into it. The defendant
infers .from this experiment that plaintiff must have
been negligent in that he must have put 155 pounds of
air into the tire (notwithstanding his positive evidence
that he did not), because otherwise the tire would not
have exploded. Defendant points to the further evidence
that the air tank at plaintiff's service station was maintained at a pressure of 175 pounds, and, therefore,
defendant infers, plaintiff must have used at least 155
pounds of the available air. It would be much more
reasonable to infer from the experiment, in light of all
the evidence in the case, that the experimental tire was
without defect as it had the specified strength to withstand 155 pounds of air before the bead wires broke,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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\Yherens the tire \Yhirh injnrPd the plaintiff \Yas grPatly
defertiYe bern use it \Yas capable of \Yithstanding a pressure of h\ss than 40 pounds. Another reasonable inference to be dra\vn from the l"\xperiment is that the tire
\vhich injured the plaintiff must have been more defective in respects other than the broken bead wires than
the experimental tire because it exploded when inflated
with less than 40 pounds of a.ir; whereas, the experimental tire after the wires had been broken did not
explode until it had received 53 pounds of air.
Again counsel complains that the court completely
overlooked all the testimony relative to the explosion
being caused by the used tube being placed in the tire
and becoming wedged between the bead of the tire and
the rim. In this respect, counsel shows an abject devotion to improper inference. He states the proposition
that the plaintiff placed a. used tube in the tire, which
is true. From this solitary fact, he infers, against the
direct evidence, that the plaintiff improperly mounted
the tire; and he further infers that part of the tube,
because it was used, became wedged between the bead
and the rim. From this, counsel further assumes that
all the 20 bead wires were broken by less than 40 pounds
of air pressure ; and he blames a.ll this on a used tube,
from which we conclude that the only safe thing to do
to a used tube is to burn it. In arriving at its verdict,
the jury was not required to follow defendant's devious
course of reasoning with respect to the used tube. On
the contrary it found the plaintiff's testimony to be true
and Sponsored
it believed
Dr. Linford when he stated that the
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ex plo~iou was caused because the bead wires were
dLlfPet iv(•, allowing the tube to extrude, and under his

ntathemati<·al c·alculations, the tire exploded under a
strPsH of 1,000 pounds rather than 5,600 pounds. Under
the l'\·idt·tH'P the tire was properly mounted by the plaintiil', aud lte PXamined the tire in the mounting process to
Inake t·t~rtain thu t no portion of the tube was wedged
hllt \\'t~en the easing and the rim. There was testimony
by l~~spoudent 's expert ~lr. Taylor that the explosion
might have Lt·t·n caused by the wedging of the tube
ht·tween the bead and the rim, assuming that the tube
\Vas '\\'L~dged bet"Teen the bead and the rim. But even
on this hypothetical situation, the jury was entitled to
belieYe Dr. Linford when he stated that, assuming such
fact to be true, it would not be a significant factor in
the explosion.
There was no evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that the plaintiff was negligent. Under

the particular evidence in this case there was no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that
a third party caused the explosion. From the particular
evidence in this case, the inference is compelling that
the explosion was not caused by a third party because
of the extraordinary force that would be required to
break the bead.
The defendant would induce the court to infer that
the insulated bead wires may have lost their strength
to resist less than 40 pounds of air pressure simply
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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b~~a.use the tire had been stored for a period. of time.

The manufaeturer of a tirt'' could not take much pride
in its product if it 'vould become worthless through
being exposed to the 'Yeather conditions that existed in
the storeroom of the Granite Furniture Company during
the period of time involved. There was no evidence that
the room in 'Yhich the tire 'vas stored "'"as either cold,
damp, "~et or otherwise rlimatized in any manner that
could have adversely affected the tire; and tires in their
normal and expected use are subjected to all types of
cold, damp, muddy weather conditions.
It thus appears, although the defendant is allergic
to the use of reasonable, if not compelling, inferences by
the court, defendant does not hesitate to urge upon the
court many inferences that are neither reasonable nor
compelling, from which the writer concludes that the
defendant's aversion to inferences is limited strictly to
those which are reasonable and compelling and his devotion to inferences is limited strictly to those which are
remote and unlikely, but which benefit his theory.
Among other things, the jury in arriving at its verdict, and this court in reinstating it were entitled to find
that the tire was new and had never been mounted
before; that in the absence of defect the strength of the
bead wires was such that the tire would not explode
until 155 pounds of air pressure had been inserted into
it or 5,600 pounds of force had been applied to pull the
bead; that the wire used in the bead was delivered to
the plaintiff
on large reels about three feet in diameter
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ig-lHld between 600 and 700 pounds; that the wire
\\'tlt; fin.;t delivered to the defendant's Akron, Ohio, plant
and frou1 tht~re removed to defendant's Wako, Texas,
plant (ne<"essarily requiring the use of machinery in
baudliug-) ; that the tire exploded after being properly
u1ouuted wl1tln less than 40 pounds of air had been introdta·t>d iuto it; that x-rays taken of the tire after the
t>Xplol"ion indieated that all of the 20 wires were broken;
the bead was so defective that it could not withstand a
pull of 1,000 pounds rather than 5,600 pounds,. which
represented the specification for a non-defective bead;
that in the manufacture of tires the defendant makes
the following inspections (each one of which could have
been negligently made, and at least one of which-the
last one-must have been negligently made}:
autl

\\'t:

(a) The bead wires are inspected as they leave the
reels. ( R. 346)
(b) The beads are inspected in the beginning of
the tire making process after the wires are wound. (R.
324)
(c) After the bead wrap has been applied, they are
inspected again to see that the wrap completely covers
the wire. ( R. 328)
(d) After the tire has been completely examined
on a drum, it is inspected before traveling on a conveyor
to the case room. (R. 345)
(e) There is an inspection at the baggage extractor
mechanism after the tire is cured where beads have been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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kinked and a. lot of defective tires are dra,vn out. (R.
355)
(f) When tires leaYe thl) curing room .they are
hung on a conYeyor which passes through the Inspection department for final inspection. (R. 343)
(g) The inspector takes the tire with each hand
and puts force on both beads of the tire. If he rejects
the tire, he puts it into a pile which passes to another
department for further investigation. (R. 344) If the
majority of the wires in the bead are broken, or if the
bead is kinked, the final inspector will detect it if he
does his job properly. (R. 356)
It is unconceivable that a tire so defective as the
tire involved in this lawsuit could have left the defendant's factory without negligence on the part of the
defendant. The manufacturer knew that the tire was a
highly dangerous instrumentality which could cause
serious bodily injury or death if it were put to the use
for which it was designed. Certainly they would have
the duty to carefully inspect and to test, if necessary,
the tire before placing it upon the market. The evidence
is clear in this case that the defect in this tire could
have been easily detected by mere manual flexion of the
tire, and that such procedure is supposed to be followed
when the tire passes through its final inspection.
Throughout its brief the defendant has overlooked
the esta~lished principle recognized in the opinion of
the court, that on an appeal from a directed verdict the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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evidc·nce ntust be reviewed in the light most favorable
to thL~ losing party.

POINT II.
rl'HIH

CASJ~~

D()J~~S

NOT EXTEND THE DOCrl'Hll\~~ ()F, ItEH IPSA LOQUITUR TO CASES
\rHJ~~RE rriii•~ J)()(~TJ{IN~ HAS NO APPLICATION.

In its brief defendant arrays against the unbiased
decision of this court, the biased opinion of a contributor
to the ''Insurance Counsel Journal'' which criticizes the
very recent Wisconsin case of Ryan vs. Philco, 1954, 266
Wis. 630, 64 N.E. 2d 226. Mr. Gibbs (the contributor)
is not only opposed to the Wisconsin decision, but he is
also opposed to Prosser on Torts and to the majority
view in the bursting bottle cases, and we assume that
Mr. Gibbs would also be opposed to the decision rendered
by this court in this case. We desire to take the following quotation from the Wisconsin case, appearing
at page 233 of the N. E. Reports:
''In the instant case we are of the opinion that
the plaintiff would establish that there was no
intervening negligence on the part of other persons which could have caused the short circuit in
the sealed unit of the refrigerator after it left
Philco 's possession. Philco is charged with knowledge that such refrigerators are transported by
common carrier from its factory to points of distribution and sale, and that purchasers of the
~arne do on occasion have to remove them the
same as other household furniture and appliances
when they move from one place of residence to
another. Therefore, it is also the duty of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant to so make such sealed unit that the
ordinary jars and jolts received in transportation
by common carrier, or in moving the refrigerator
by motor truck from one location to another would
not dislodge its parts so as to cause a short circuit. The eYidence disclosed the position and
handling of the refrigerator from the time it was
uncrated at the shop of the dealer to the time of
the accident. It 'vas transported by the dealer in
the normal course of business and installed in
the Zick home at Fox Lake by merely plugging
the refrigerator cord into an electric outlet. When
the Zicks moved from Fox Lake to Beaver Dam
they employed a professional mover to move the
furniture and the refrigerator. That such moving
had no effect on the mechanism of the refrigerator
is attested by the fact that Mrs. Zick noticed the
same tingling sensation when mopping the floor
in the home at Fox Lake before such moving that
was observed after. It was definitely established
that no one attempted to adjust or tinker with
the sealed unit mechanism. In other words, Philco's original exclusive control of the sealed unit
carried up to the time of the accident, even though
its physical possession thereof had ended at
the time of shipment. We, therefore, on the
basis of analogy to the bursting bottle cases, think
that it was entirely proper to invoke the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, and permit the jury to draw
the inference that it did from the short circuit
causing plaintiff's injury. Refrigerators do not
ordinarily transmit electric current through the
handle so as to severely shock and injure persons
who may grasp such handle in the customary use
thereof.
"The duty to exercise· reasonable care on the
part of the manufacturer of an article, which if
defective, may be imminently dangerous, includes
the proper inspection and testing of the article. ' '
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The ease cites with approval a Minnesota case of
J>etersou rs. M·i,unesota Power a;n.d Light Company, 207
l\1 inu. :~87; 2!)1 N. W. 705, 707, and Bosch vs. Damm, 296
l\1 h·l1.

52~;

\V P

206 N. W. 669.

~ulnnit

that the Wisconsin decision, deplored by
1\tr. <lihh~ in the "lusurance Counsel Journal," is a well
reasoned decision ; and we respectfully commend it to
this l'ourt 's attention.
The ease of Jlatievitch vs. Hercules Powder Company, (lTtah), 282 P. 2d 1044, is clearly distinguishable
from the case at bar. In that case there was no evidence
explaining the explosion of the dynamite and cap, and
there was no evidence as to how and why the dynamite
exploded. In the case now before the court, there was
evidence of a defective bead and evidence that a defective bead caused the explosion. We see no inconsistency
between the court's decision in this case and its decision
in the Hercules Powder Company case.

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON
THE VERDICT AND THE JUDGMENT FROM
APRIL 23, 1953.
Counsel for the defendant have stated that in the
event the petition for rehearing is denied they will not
pay interest on the judgment from the time the verdict
and judgment on the verdict were entered. There is approximately $2,500.00 interest involved in this case. The
verdict was rendered April 23, 1953, (R. 63-A) and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment on the Yerdirt \Yas entered April ~:~rd, 1953.
(R. 63).
Section 15-1-4, [Tfah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
that the judgment obtained in this case shall bear
interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Rule 54 (e) provides as follows :
" (e) Interest and Costs to be Included in the
Judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict
or decision from the time it was rendered, and
the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after
the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any
case where not included in the judgment, insert
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the Register of Actions and in the
Judgment Docket.''

This court in its decision ordered that the judgment
upon the jury verdict be reinstated. We respectfully
contend that the judgment should bear interest from
April 23, 1953, as the clerk is required by statute to
allow interest from the date of the verdict, and plaintiff
would not receive full justice under the law upon reinstatement of the verdict unless such interest is allowed.
In view of the expressed attitude of counsel for the
defendant in this matter, we respectfully move this court
to include in its order denying the petition for rehearing a further order allowing plaintiff interest on the
judgment on the verdict from April 23, 1953, in order
to obviate the necessity of this matter being brought
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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again before this court in a later proceeding. In the
('ase of Keller vs. Ohournos, 95 Utah 31, 70 P. 2d 86, the
court revised its judgment to include interest at the
statutory rate, which had inadvertently been omitted
from its opinion.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully conclude that the decision rendered
in this matter is in all respects fair, just and right and
properly applies the law to the evidence in this case, and
that the defendant's Petition for Rehearing should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,

WOODROW D. WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff
0/IU], Appelloot.
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